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CASE NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THIRD PARTY PRACTICE-ANTICIPATED
RECOURSE FOR THE PASSIVELY NEGLIGENT
Linda Sargent, a minor, was injured by a motor vehicle while she was
crossing a street. The vehicle was owned by the Sun Ray Fluorescent Company
and was driven by its employee, David Herskovitz. In Count I of her complaint she charged these defendants with seven acts of negligence in the
operation of their vehicle. Count II of the complaint was directed against the
owner and driver of another vehicle: Interstate Bakeries, Inc. and Steve
Diklich. She charged these defendants with negligence in parking their
vehicle at the crosswalk of the intersection and alleged that this also caused
her to be injured. Interstate Bakeries and Diklich filed a third party complaint for indemnity against the Sun Ray Company and Herskovitz contending that their own negligence was passive while that of Herskovitz was
active and was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The Circuit
Court of Cook County dismissed the complaint, but the Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed holding that Interstate's third party complaint stated a cause
of action for indemnity and entitled Interstate to a trial on the merits.
Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769
(1967).
This same theory was also upheld in Trzos v. Berman Leasing Company'
wherein the initial or primary defendants alleged their negligence, if any, to
be only passive and that of another, not a party to the original suit, to be
active, therefore affording to the primary defendants a right to indemnity as
inSargent.
Sargent and Trzos are examples of third party actions under Section 25 of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 as amended in 1955. A third party action is
a relatively recent feature of civil procedure whereby a defendant alleged to
be liable for a specific injury can bring into the controversy a new party, a
person not originally joined by the plaintiff, for the purpose of showing that
the party impleaded is liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim. Prior to 1955 this could not be accomplished in Illinois, as Section 25
then consisted only of the following:
If a complete determination of a controversy cannot be had without the presence
of other parties, the court may direct them to be brought in. If a person, not a
186 Ill. App. 2d 176, 229 N.E.2d 787 (1967).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 25 (1967).
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party, has an interest or title which the judgment may affect, the court, on
application, shall direct him to be made a party. 3
This only gave a counterclaimant the right to bring in third parties as additional counterdefendants. 4 Thus, if a defendant had no basis upon which to
file a counterclaim, he consequently had no right to implead a new party,
since this section only applied when the defendant filed a counterclaim which
required the presence of other parties necessary to a full determination of his
counterclaim. Only in this situation could another party be impleaded by a
defendant. Hence, prior to 1955, but for a lone municipal court rule, 5 there
was no complete third party practice per se, which could be used universally
in all situations, in Illinois.
On July 19, 1955 the following paragraph was added to Section 25 to be
effective January 1, 1956:6
Within the time for filing his answer or thereafter by leave of court, a defendant
may by third-party complaint bring in as a defendant a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him. Subsequent pleadings shall be filed as in the case of a complaint and with like
designation and effect. The third-party defendant may assert any defenses which
he has to the third-party complaint or which the third-party plaintiff has to the
plaintiff's claim and shall have the same right to file a counterclaim or third-party
complaint as any other defendant. If the plaintiff desires to assert against the
third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the
third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant, he shall do so
by an appropriate pleading. When a counterclaim is filed against a party, he may
in like manner proceed against third-parties. Nothing herein applies to liability
insurers or creates any substantive right to contribution among tortfeasors or
7
against insurer or other person which has not heretofore existed.
This provided Illinois with a true third party practice, comparable to that of
federal courts 8 and of nine other states.9 By this provision, any defendant,
3ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
4

§ 25(1) (1967).

See Johnson v. Moon, 3 InI. 2d 561, 121 N.E.2d 774, 46 A.L.R.2d 1246 (1954).

5 CAPLAN, THE MUNICIPAL COURT MANUAL OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO 29

(1950): "Third-party procedure. (1) By Defendants. A defendant, upon giving notice to
the plaintiff, may move for leave to serve a third-party-claim upon a person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable to the defendant or to the plaintiff for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. . . . (2) By Plaintiffs. When a counterclaim
is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so."
6 Brunsman, Parties-JoinderAnd Third Party Practice, 44 ILL. B. J. 371 (1956).
7 ILL. REv.

STAT. ch. 110, § 25(2) (1967).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 14: "A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against
any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of

the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant."
9

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§

21-446, 21-447 (Supp. 1967); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 14; IowA
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whether or not he files a counterclaim, may implead a third party. The new
party need not have an interest or title which will be affected by a judgment,
nor must his presence hinge upon a complete determination of the controversy
being rendered. In order for a third-party defendant to be impleaded, the
primary defendant must only show that the third party is or may be liable
to him for a portion of the plaintiff's claim.
This note will analyze third party actions both from a procedural and
substantive view. Procedurally, a third party may be impleaded as long as
certain standards are met; what these standards are and how they are to be
applied will be discussed. Substantively, this note will show how third party
practice has and will continue to affect both indemnity and contribution.
Procedurally, third party actions have many advantages. Of utmost importance to the defendant is the fact that he is no longer obliged to wait
until his liability has been determined or until he has paid the plaintiff's
damages in order to bring an action against another for contribution or
indemnity.' The defendant need no longer be "out of pocket"; he can now
implead another party in conjunction with the plaintiff's action and force
him to pay all or part of the plaintiff's claim. For example, in a suit against
an employer arising out of the conduct of his employee, the latter may be
impleaded for the purpose of idemnification. The complete burden of loss will
thus fall on the employee and the defendant will not be required to pay any
portion of the plaintiff's damages. On the other hand, absent a third party
practice, the employer would be forced to pay the plaintiff's total damages
and then institute his own action against the employee for recovery.
Another advantage of a third party action is its allowance for a full and
final determination of a controversy by providing a means to hear issues
arising between the plaintiff, defendant and a third party concurrently." A
multiplicity of actions is thereby diminished as are both the necessity of a
second trial, and, in many instances, the relitigation of identical issues. Also
the parties can be assured that all common questions involved will be afforded identical treatment and that the possibility of different constructions
by separate juries of the same evidence will be eliminated.' 2 Hence, expediency without a sacrifice of a fair administration of justice is the greatest
asset of third party practice, one which is especially desirable in this day of
crowded court calendars and dockets.
R. Civ. P. 33(b); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.080 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(14)
(Supp. 1967); N.Y. STAT. ANN. § 1007 (1962); PA. R. Civ. P. 2252-2256; TEX. R. Cxv.
P. 38; WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.19, 260.20 (Supp. 1969).

1o Embree v. Gormley, 49 111.App. 2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (1964).
11 Grewenig v. American Baking Co., 293 11. App. 604, 609, 13 N.E.2d 183, 185 (1938);
Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 12, 20, 184 N.E.2d 808, 812 (1962);
Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 226 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1967).
12 Supra note 6, at 377.
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Necessary to the successful maintenance of a third party action is the requirement that the primary defendant have at least a possibility of recovery
from the third party defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim.13 Thus
the primary defendant must be a conduit through which liability may be
imposed upon a third party. 14 There must be a circuit of liability flowing
from the third party to the primary defendant and in turn from the primary
defendant to the plaintiff. A primary defendant may not, therefore, validly
implead a third party who is or may be liable to the plaintiff alone. 1 If the
primary defendant merely alleges that the third party is liable to the plaintiff and not to him, the circuit is broken. In effect, the primary defendant is
thereby attempting to eliminate himself and substitute the new party as
defendant. 16 Such attempt must fail, as only the plaintiff has the right to7
choose the party or parties against whom he wishes to institute his action.1
A valid third party action not only requires this possibility of recovery
by the primary defendant against the third party, but also a potential liability of the primary defendant to the original plaintiff. That is, recovery
by the plaintiff against the primary defendant must be feasible before a
third party action can be initiated.' 8 This comprises the second facet of the
circuit; if there is no possibility of liability of the primary defendant to the
plaintiff the circuit is also broken and any third party action must consequently fail.
While it is true that procedural rules do not create for a third party plaintiff any greater rights than those conferred by substantive law, 19 third party
practice has and will have a noteworthy impression on the application and
13 See Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., supra note 11; Yankey v. Oscar Bohlin & Son,
Inc., 37 Ill.
App. 2d 457, 186 N.E.2d 57 (1962).

14 See Embree v. Gormley, supra note 10.
15 This is illustrated by the case of D'Amico v. Moriarty Meat Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d
63, 197 N.E.2d 445 (1964), which involved a suit by a business invitee against the owner
and occupier of land for failing to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition. The
defendant then filed a third party complaint alleging that he had a possible right to
indemnity since another bad created the dangerous condition which caused the harm.
This was held to be a valid third party complaint, as the defendant alleged that the
third party was liable to "him" and not to the plaintiff for the injury. See Scott v.
Curtis, 195 N.Y. 424, 88 N.E. 794 (1909) ; Home Telephone Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co.,
214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104 (1926); Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky.
396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortjeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517, 522 (1952).

16 A case illustrating this point is Halligan v. Shulman, 31 111. App. 2d 168, 175 N.E.2d
590 (1961), in which the third party complaint showed no possibility of recovery by the
defendant from the third party, but only that the third party was liable to the plaintiff.
.7Fort v. Bash, 10 F.R.D. 626, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
18See Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
19Miller v. DeWitt, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 141, 208 N.E.2d 249, 298 (1965).
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utilization of substantive law. 20 The greatest development, as exemplified by
Sargent and Trzos, will continue to be seen in the areas of indemnity and
21
contribution between joint tortfeasors.
Prosser defines indemnity as the shifting of "the entire loss from one
tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who
should bear it instead. 2'1 2 It will not be allowed in all cases 23 but only in
limited situations, as for example where the indemnitor owes a duty of his
own to the indemnitee.2 4 Hence, if a person is held liable but is without fault,
he can recover indemnity from the actual wrongdoer.25 This is illustrated by
the doctrine of respondeat superior 26 by which a master is liable for the
unauthorized acts of his servant done within the general scope of employment.2 7 Where the master has been held liable for his employee's torts, he

can, through a third party action, hold the servant liable and he has a right
of indemnification against his servant for any damages he has to pay because
28
of the servant's wrongful acts.
20

See Brunsman, supra note 6.

21See Brunsman, supra note 6.
22 PROSSER, TORTS § 48 (3d ed. 1964). See also McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,
304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952) ; Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77
A.2d 368, 24 A.L.R.2d 319 (1951); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d
355, 43 A.L.R.2d 865 (1954) ; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. National Bank of Tacoma,
59 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1932).
23 Davis, supra note 15, at 531-36: "Indemnity will not be allowed if (a) both parties
are equally negligent (b) both parties are the proximate cause of the injury (c) both
parties are primarily responsible for the injury."
24 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949). See, e.g.,
Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449, 140 A.L.R. 1301 (1941); George A.
Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918).
25 Skelton, Contribution And Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 33 TENN. L. REV.
184, 186 (1966). See, e.g., Canadian Indem. Co. v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 213 F.2d 658 (9th
Cir. 1954) ; Thomas v. Malco Refineries, 214 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1954); American
Southern Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Service, 275 Ala. 51, 151 So.2d 783 (1963); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801, 57 A.L.R.2d 914
(1956).
26
See Herr v. Simplex Paper Box Corp., 330 Pa. 129, 198 A. 309 (1938) ; Jack Cole Co.
v. Hoff, 274 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. App. 1954); McDermott v. W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass.
736, 49 N.E.2d 115 (1943); Schisano v. Brickseal Refractory Co., 62 N.J. Super. 269,
162 A.2d 904 (1960); Stawasz v. Aetna Ins. Co., 99 Ill. App. 2d 131, 240 N.E.2d 702
(1968).

27See Potter v. Golden Rule Grocery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S.W.2d 364 (1935);
Gillis v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283, 150 A.L.R. 1330
(1943); Novick v. Gouldsberry, 173 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1949). Compare Mayhew v.
DeCoursey, 135 Kan. 184, 10 P.2d 10 (1932); Idom v. Weeks, 135 Miss. 65, 99 So. 761,
40 A.L.R. 668 (1924).
28 Stawasz v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra note 26. See also Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal. 2d
159, 231 P.2d 484 (1951); Holcomb v. Flavin, 37 II. App. 2d 359, 185 N.E.2d 716
(1962) ; Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., supra note 11.
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A right to indemnity also accrues where there is a disproportion or difference in the character of the duties owed to the plaintiff. 29 For example, a
landowner has a non-delegable duty to maintain his premises in a safe condition to all invitees. If another created a dangerous condition that caused
harm to an invitee, the landowner may be indemnified3 ° unless he, the landowner, knew of the condition.-" Illinois reaches this result by allowing indemnity where the parties are not in pari delicto32 or where one is legally
liable for injuries to a third person caused by the negligence of another in
33
which he does not himself participate.
The third broad area in which indemnity will be granted entails a great
or substantial disparity in the gravity of the fault of each of the two tortfeasors.3 4 This is denominated the "active-passive" theory of negligenceindemnity will be granted against an active wrongdoer in favor of one who
bears a passive relationship to the cause of the injury. 35
Many courts have been reluctant to delineate and define active and passive
negligence. However, in Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co.36
the court stated, "Passive negligence exists where one person negligently
brings about a condition or an occasion and active negligence exists where
another party negligently acts upon that condition and perpetrates a
wrong. ' 37 A similar explanation was given in King v. Timber Structures, Inc.
of California" where it was held that, "one is passively negligent if he merely
29

Davis, supra note 15 at 546. See, e.g., Doyle v. Union Ry. Co., 276 N.Y. 453, 12
N.E.2d 541, reversing 251 App. Div. 564, 296 N.Y.S. 877 (1937) ; Farrelly v. City of
Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 516, 17 A.2d 191 (1941).
30 See Davis, supra note 15, at 549. See, e.g., Am. Dist. Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 179
F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); U. S. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1949).
31Morgan Warehouse & Commercial Co. v. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 60 S.W.2d 1053 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933). See, e.g., Jones v. Beck, 109 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Hartford v. Coolidge-Locher Co., 314 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
32 Holcomb v. Flavin, supra note 28; Spivack v. Hara, 69 Ill. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d
173 (1966); Skala v. Lehon, 343 Il. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931).
3 John Griffiths & Son Co. v. Nat'l Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923);
Sleck v. Butler Bros., 53 111.App. 2d 7, 202 N.E.2d 64 (1964).
34 See Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally Washington
Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); Builders Supply Co. v.
McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368, 24 A.L.R.2d 319 (1951); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N.E.2d 568, 31 A.L.R.2d 1317 (1952).
35 Miller v. DeWitt, supra note 11; Embree v. Gormley, supra note 10; Dobbins v.
Beachler, 47 Il. App. 2d 30, 197 N.E.2d 518 (1964); Rovekamp v. Central Const. Co.,
45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 756 (1964) ; Hyten v. Kleffman, 31 111. App. 2d 273,
175 N.E.2d 632 (1961).
36 178 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1949).
37

Id. at 632.

38

240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966).
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fails to act in fulfillment of a duty of care which the law imposes on him ....
One is actively negligent if he participates in some manner in the conduct
'39
or omission which caused the injury.
Prior to Sargent and Trzos, the vast majority of cases in Illinois40 only
applied this active-passive theory where there existed a prior relationship
between the parties41 as for example lessor-lessee, 42 master-servant, 43 vendorvendee, 44 or employer-employee. 4 5 Relief was predicated on the existence of
a community of interest or derivative liability between the defendants in
their relationship to the plaintiff. Hence, indemnity was granted only where
there was some relationship between the defendant and the third party,
exclusive of the fortuitous fact that they both might be liable to an injured
party for their actions. 46 But in Sargent and Trzos there was no such relationship or derivative liability. Before the injury to the plaintiff, the primary defendant and the third party he sought to implead had never consorted with
each other. There was no prior connection; they were in fact "complete
strangers." Yet, in both cases the court saw the possibility of a difference in
the degree of negligence of the tortfeasors and allowed the third party action
to stand, on the ground that the third party may be liable to the initial
defendant for indemnity via the active-passive theory. This is the most important aspect of Sargent and Trzos. Together they develop a trend in
Illinois toward allowing indemnity under the active-passive theory even where
there was no prior relationship or derivative liability. The rationale underlying the evolution of this trend is expressed by the court in Sargent: "Nor
does absence of a specific relationship necessarily prove that the codefendants
'4 7
were in 'pari delicto' and thereby preclude indemnity.
39 Id. at 182, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
4

OReynolds v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 51 Ill.
App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964),
which involved a similar factual situation to Sargent, was the only case in Illinois prior

to Sargent and Trzos which applied the active-passive theory of indemnity where there
was no prior relationship between the parties.
41 See Pritchett, Comparative Negligence, Contribution, Collateral Source, an Illinois
Appraisal, 56 II. B.J. 468, 475 (1968).
42 Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 Ill.
App. 2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1953); Blaszak v.

Union Tank Car Co., supra note 11.
43

Supra note 27.

44 See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718 (1920)
Boston Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901).
45
Sack v. Arcole Midwest Corp., 33 Ill. App. 2d 344, 179 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
46 In Spivack v. Hara, supra note 32, at 24, 216 N.E.2d at 174, the appellate court
held: "The usual case in which this exception [viz., the active-passive theory of indemnity] is applied involves a specific relationship where the defendant incurring
derivative liability has neither participated in the wrongful act nor known of the condition which caused the injury."
47 Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 191, 229 N.E.2d 769, 771
(1967).
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Hence, third party practice, while not directly changing substantive law,
has exerted a decided influence by affording a means through which the
concept of indemnity may best be used to facilitate a full determination of
a controversy in one action. 48 It also has expanded the scope of the activepassive theory, extending its application to a situation wherein no prior
relationship is necessary.
Contribution, unlike indemnity, does not constitute the shifting of the
entire loss from one tortfeasor to another but involves a distribution of the
burden. 49 It amounts to a proportionate sharing of the loss among tortfeasors
pursuant to the degree of their fault. These two concepts are often confused
as evidenced by the fact that many courts have allowed indemnity under the
name of contribution.5 ° At common law, contribution was not allowed between joint tortfeasors, 51 on the theory that no relief by way of distribution
of the loss should be allowed a person whose wrongful conduct lent to the
injury. 52 It was felt that if contribution were granted, it would favor a
wealthy defendant at the expense of a relatively poor defendant and provide
for a situation inconsistent with the desires and good of society. 53 However,
this rule has been interpreted by many to apply only in cases of wilful and
intentional wrongdoers. 54 Accordingly, some states have allowed contribution
in cases wherein the claimant committed an unintentional breach of the law,""
and others have passed statutes modifying the common law rule.5 6
48 If a defendant can show that he has a possible right to indemnity from another not
a party to the plaintiff's action, he may bring a third party action, since he would have
fulfilled the "is or may be liable to the defendant" requirement of § 25(2).
49 PROSSER, supra note 22, at 47. See also Canosia Twp. v. Grand Lake Twp., 80 Minn.
357, 83 N.W. 346 (1900) ; Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927).

50Supra note 35.
51

Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186 (1799).
Mannino, Civil Procedure-ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors-Rights of Insurers, 44 N. C. L. REV. 142, 144 (1965).
53 James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
52

REV. 1156, 1165 (1941).
54 See Bohlen, Contribution And Indemnity Between Tortjeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552,
22 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1936-37); Leflar, Contribution And Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortjeasors, 26 T.x. L. REV. 150 (1947); Gregory, Contribution Among Tortleasors: A
Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 365.

55 The following five states have allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors without
legislation: Iowa-Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1963); Maine-Bedell
v. Reagen, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963) ; Minnesota-Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Tennessee-Huggins v.
Grayes, 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Wisconsin-Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,
114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
5
HArkansas-ARX. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1967); California-CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE §§ 875-880 (1968) ; Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1966) ; Georgia
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Since 185657 Illinois has adhered strictly to the common law rule and has
not allowed contribution. 58 While there have been attempts to formulate
exceptions to the rule, these have materialized in the area of indemnity under
the guise of contribution.59 No Illinois court has allowed contribution even
for mere negligence between joint tortfeasors. 60 The Illinois legislature has
not passed any statute in this regard,6 1 nor have they adopted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 62 Hence, at present there is no right
to contribution in Illinois. This even extends into the federal system, 6 3 since
before a third party action can be initiated at the federal level, the substantive law of the particular states involved must be examined to see whether
contribution is allowed. 64 If no right to contribution exists, a defendant canCODE ANN. §§ 105-2011 to -2012 (1968); Hawaii-HAWAIi REV. LAWS §§ 246-10
to -16 (1965); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1966); Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2103-05 (1967); Maryland-MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1968); Massachusetts-MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231b, §§ 1-4 (1968); Michigan-Micw. STAT. ANN.
§ 27a.2925 (1968); Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1962); Missouri-Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.060 (1968); New Jersey-N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2a:53a-1 to -5 (1968); New
Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1968); New York-N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
§ 1401 (1968); North Carolina-N.C. GENm. STAT. ANN. § 1-240 (1967); North DakotaN.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1967); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 2082-89 (1968); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1968); South
Dakota-S.D. CODE §§ 33.04A01-33.04A10 (1968); Texas-TFx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 2212 (1968); Virginia-VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1968); West Virginia-W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-7-13 (1968).
57 Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856).
-GA.

58 Pritchett, supra note 41, at 474.

59 See supra note 35.
60 Comment, Contribution & Indemnity In Illinois Negligence Cases, 19 U. Crux. L.
REV. 388, 393 (1952).
61 Proehl, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors, 49 ILL. B.J. 880, 883 (1961).
62 9 U.L.A. § 4 (1955). See also Augustin v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp.,
283 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1960). The following states have adopted this act: Arkansas,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South
Dakota. See 18 Am. JirR. 2d Contribution § 41 (1968); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1107
(1954).
63 In D'Onofrio Const. Co. v. Recon Co., 225 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), it was held that
the federal rule regarding impleader could not be used to affect the substantive results,
so that if by the law of the state a joint tortfeasor is not liable to his co-tortfeasors for
contribution, no such liability can be imposed upon him by the federal court on a
third-party complaint. For example, in the case of Holstlaw v. Southern Ry. Co., 9
F.R.D. 276 (D. Mo. 1949), the court held that since under the law of Illinois (the state
in which the defendant's train collided with the automobile in which the plaintiff was
riding) a defendant would not be entitled to contribution from an automobile driver
whose negligence allegedly caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant
was not entitled to make the driver a third party under federal rules.
64 Keeffe and Cotter, Service Of Process In Suits Against Directors: A Barrier to
Justice, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 74, 83 (1941). See also Thompson v. Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270
(W.D. N.Y. 1942), aff'd 132 F.2d 631, 148 A.L.R. 1178, cert. denied 319 U.S. 741 (1942)
Bache v. Dixie-Ohio Exp. Co., 8 F.R.D. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
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not implead a joint tortfeasorf 5 under federal third party practice. 6
But Section 25 (2) is broad enough to include the possibility that contribution may be allowed in Illinois in the future as is indicated by the language,
"who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him," the word "part" denoting a sharing of the plaintiff's claim between
the defendant and the third party. Today the section can be utilized for
indemnity purposes under the active-passive theory, where the parties are
not in pari delicto or where one incurs a legal liability. Tomorrow the
section may be available to afford a defendant the right of contribution
against a third party.
This may not lie in the too distant future, as there is dictum in Sargent
which indicates a discernible trend toward some form of contribution in
Illinois. The court notes that the Illinois Judicial Conference in 1964 unan0 7
imously adopted a resolution favoring contribution among joint tortfeasors
noting that, "[t]he possibility of inequity is unavoidable until the rule
against contribution yields to a more rational approach which will place upon
each tortfeasor liability in proportion to his own culpability."0' s
Many writers have concurred with the Sargent court's suggestion that
contribution should be allowed if there is a disproportion of fault among
wrongdoers. 9 But if this trend is to materialize it will more than likely have
to originate in the Illinois legislature. This is in view of a recent Illinois
Supreme Court decision which refused to substitute judicially the doctrine of
comparative negligence for contributory negligence. The court held:
After full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching change, if
desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by the Court. The General
Assembly is the department of government to which the Constitution has entrusted
the power of changing the laws. 70
Therefore, the 1969 session of the Illinois General Assembly will certainly
65 Oliver, Federal Practice: Third-party Practice in the District Courts: Impleader oj
a Joint Tortfeasor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a): Erie v. Tompkins, 28
CORNFLL L.Q. 89, 93 (1942). See also Mitchell v. Duquesne Brewing Co., 34 F.R.D. 145
(W.D. Pa. 1963).
0

6 FED. R. Cxv. P. 14.

67 Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., supra note 47, at 197, 229 N.E.2d at 774.

68 Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., supra note 47, at 202, 229 N.E.2d at 776.
69 See Pritchett, supra note 41; supra note 60; Proehl, supra note 61; Hennessey,
Torts: Indemnity and Contribution, 47 MAss. L.Q. 421 (1962) ; Mannino, supra note 52;
Davis, Contribution Between Tortfeasors, 25 MODERN L. REV. 357 (1962); McIntire,
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: Louisiana's Past, Present, And Future, 37 TutL.
L. REv. 525 (1963).
70Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.2d. 193, 196, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1968). See generally
Comment, Comparative Negligence-The Developing Doctrine and the Death of Maki,
18 DEPAUL L. REV. 203 (1968).
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bear watching to see if a realistic system of loss distribution will be formulated through the adoption of both contribution and comparative negligence.
If contribution is adopted, third party practice in Illinois will be ready.
William Tymm

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AID TO PAROCHIAL SOHOOLS AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-EVERSON TO ALLEN:
FROM BUSES TO BOOKS AND BEYOND
Section 701 of the Education Law of the State of New York requires local
public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students
in grades seven through twelve upon the individual request of any student
in a public or private school.' Only textbooks which are required for one
semester or more in a particular class and those textbooks which are either
designated for use in a public school in the state or approved by a board
of education may be lent. 2 Plaintiffs, members of local school boards, sought
a declaratory judgment that the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the state3 and federal constitutions.4 It was their contention that the
lending of textbooks by the State of New York free of charge to students
attending parochial schools amounted to an establishment of religion and
that the requirement of paying taxes to provide textbooks for such students
inhibited plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. In a 4-3 decision the New York
Court of Appeals held that the statute violated neither the state nor the
federal constitution.5 The United States Supreme Court, concerned only
with the federal constitutional question, affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
The "primary purpose and effect" test first adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Abington Township v. Schempp6 formed the basis of the
majority opinion. The Court considered section 701 of New York's education law to have a secular legislative purpose and primary effect which
neither advanced nor inhibited religion. 7 In 1965 the New York legislature
in amending section 701 stated the purpose for the adoption of the legislaI N. Y. EDUC.
2

LAW § 701(3) (McKinney 1968).
N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 701(3) (McKinney 1968).

3

N. Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (1894).

4 U. S. CONST. amend. I.

5 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1967).

6 374

U.S. 203 (1963).

7 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).

